Ordinal and Cardinal Solution Concepts for Two-Sided Matching

We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable - and in the nontransferable - utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade matching is one in which the availability of transfers do not affect the outcome

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Echenique, Federico
Other Persons:	Galichon, Alfred (contributor)
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Matching \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (29 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 23, 2014 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2246031 [DOI]
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064208