Ordinal Games
We study strategic games where players' preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we ex- tend Voorneveld's concept of best-response potential from cardinal to ordi- nal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordi- nal game is a best-response potential game if and only if it does not have a best-response cycle. Further, Milgrom and Shannon's concept of quasi- supermodularity is extended from cardinal games to ordinal games. We find that under certain compactness and semicontinuity assumptions, the ordinal Nash equilibria of a quasi-supermodular game form a nonempty complete lattice. Finally, we extend several set-valued solution concepts from cardinal to ordinal games in our sense.
| Year of publication: |
2007
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Durieu, Jacques ; Haller, Hans ; Querou, Nicolas ; Solal, Philippe |
| Publisher: |
Zurich : ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research |
| Subject: | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Theorie | Ordinal Games | Potential Games | Quasi-Supermodularity | Rationalizable Sets | Sets Closed under Behavior Correspondences |
Saved in:
| Series: | Economics Working Paper Series ; 07/74 |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.3929/ethz-a-005502934 [DOI] 582139694 [GVK] hdl:10419/171517 [Handle] RePEc:eth:wpswif:07-74 [RePEc] |
| Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games |
| Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753138