Outside options, component efficiency, and stability

In this paper, we introduce a component efficient value for TU games with a coalition structure which reflects the outside options of players within the same structural coalition. It is based on the idea that splitting a coalition should affect players who stay together in the same way. We show that for all TU games there is a coalition structure that is stable with respect to this value.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Casajus, André
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 65.2009, 1, p. 49-61
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	TU game Partition function form game Outside option Splitting Coalition structure Stability

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408632