Overachieving and Obsessive Behavior as Signaling Devices under Career Concern
Year of publication: |
[2021]
|
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Authors: | Rodivilov, Alexander ; Shin, Dongsoo ; Zhao, Xiaojian |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Signalling | Erwerbsverlauf | Occupational attainment | Karriereplanung | Career development | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Verhaltensökonomik | Behavioral economics | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Führungskräfte | Managers |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (23 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 15, 2020 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3711917 [DOI] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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