Ownership Concentration, Monitoring and Optimal Board Structure
Year of publication: |
[2021]
|
---|---|
Authors: | Graziano, Clara ; Luporini, Annalisa |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Vorstand | Executive board | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (39 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 2005 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.657165 [DOI] |
Classification: | G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
-
Separation of ownership and control : delegation as a commitment device
Boukouras, Aristotelis, (2011)
-
Independent Director Reputation Incentives : The Supply of Monitoring Services
Masulis, Ronald W., (2017)
-
Board Independence and Information Asymmetry in Family Firms vs. Non-Family Firms
Wu, Kean, (2019)
- More ...
-
Optimal delegation when the large shareholder has multiple tasks
Graziano, Clara, (2010)
-
Voting in corporate boards with heterogeneous preferences
Balduzzi, Paolo, (2011)
-
Do Firms Gain from Managerial Overconfidence? The Role of Severance Pay
Graziano, Clara, (2022)
- More ...