Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies

We analyze the limit behavior of sequences of oligopolistic equilibria in which firms follow objectives consistent with their shareholders’ interests. We show that convergence to a competitive outcome may fail for some distributions of firms’ shares across consumers and provide a characterization of the class of ownership structures that lead to Walrasian equilibrium allocations in the limit. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Bejan, Camelia ; Bidian, Florin
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 50.2012, 3, p. 571-602
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Firm’s objective \| Strategic foundations of competitive equilibrium \| Ownership structure

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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