Pareto efficiency in the dynamic one-dimensional bargaining model

Pareto dominated agreements are shown to prevail with positive probability in an open set of status quo in a Markov perfect equilibrium of a one-dimensional dynamic bargaining game with endogeneous status-quo. This equilibrium is continuous, symmetric, with dynamic preerences that satisfy the single-plateau proerty. It is also shown that there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium with single-peaked preferences.

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Year of publication:	2014-08
Authors:	Kalandrakis, Tasos
Institutions:	University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Wallis Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number WP66 10 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010908113