Pareto-efficient solutions for shared public good provision : Nash bargaining versus Exchange-Matching-Lindahl
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Dijkstra, Bouwe R. ; Nentjes, Andries |
Published in: |
Resource and energy economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0928-7655, ZDB-ID 1153616-0. - Vol. 61.2020, p. 1-22
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Subject: | Exchange | Lindahl mechanism | matching | Nash bargaining solution | outsourcing | public goods | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Outsourcing | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Verhandlungen | Negotiations |
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