Pareto Improvements of Nash Equilibria in Differential Games

Frequently controls forming Nash equilibria in differential games are not Pareto optimal. This paper presents conditions that can be used to show the existence of strict Pareto improvements of Nash equilibria in such games. The conditions are based on standard tools in control theory. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Seierstad, Atle
Published in:	Dynamic Games and Applications. - Springer. - Vol. 4.2014, 3, p. 363-375
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Differential games \| Nash equilibria \| Pareto improvements

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950521