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Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain

If the number of individuals is odd, majority rule is the only non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice rule on the domain of linear orders that admit a Condorcet winner (Campbell and Kelly, 2003). This paper shows that the claim is false when the number of individuals is even, and provides a counterpart to the theorem for the even case.
Year of publication:
2011
Authors: Merrill, Lauren Nicole
Published in:
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 112.2011, 3, p. 259-261
Publisher: Elsevier
Subject: Condorcet Majority winner Strategy-proof
Type of publication: Article
Source:
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009249603
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