Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining
The data reported in this paper show that in an ultimatum mini-game rejection rates of low offers are significantly reduced if participation for responders is voluntary but costly. A possible explanation based on cognitive dissonance and loss aversion is offered.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Wichardt, Philipp C. ; Schunk, Daniel ; Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 103.2009, 1, p. 33-35
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Cognitive dissonance Loss aversion Participation costs Sunk costs Ultimatum game |
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