Participation, Recruitment Selection, and the Minimum Wage
This paper reexamines the e ciency of participation with heterogeneous workers in a search-matching model with bargained wages and free entry. As- suming that rms hire their best applicants, we state that participation is insu cient whatever workers' bargaining strengths. The reason for this is that, when holding a job, the marginal participant should receive the entire output. As a consequence, introducing a (small) minimum wage raises participation, job creation, and employment. Therefore the aggregate income of the economy is enhanced.
Year of publication: |
2014-02
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gavrel, Frederic |
Institutions: | HAL |
Subject: | search and maching | participation | heterogeneous workers | applicant ranking | efficiency | minimum wage |
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