Partisan preferences and political institutions: explaining fiscal retrenchment in the European Union
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Pamp, Oliver |
Publisher: |
Berlin : Free University Berlin, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence |
Subject: | deficits | fiscal adjustment | partisan theory | veto players | time-series cross-secton models |
Series: | |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 480767866 [GVK] hdl:10419/31951 [Handle] |
Classification: | C23 - Models with Panel Data ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation ; H62 - Deficit; Surplus |
Source: |
-
Pamp, Oliver, (2004)
-
Pamp, Oliver, (2009)
-
Castells, Antoni, (2004)
- More ...
-
Income inequality & redistributional spending: An empirical investigation of competing theories
Mohl, Philipp, (2008)
-
It´s political, stupid! - EMU enlargement between an economic rock and a political hard place -
Bolle, Michael, (2006)
-
The political economy of fiscal retrenchment in the European Union : an empirical investigation
Pamp, Oliver, (2006)
- More ...