Partner Selection Decisions in Interfirm Collaborations: The Paradox of Relational Embeddedness
By combining insights from relational network theory and agency theory we identify the boundary conditions to the embeddedness approach to partner selection decisions in interfirm collaborations. Employing a longitudinal dataset comprising the investment syndicates for the population of UK management buyouts between 1993 and 2003, we find that relational embeddedness is less important for selecting partners when agency risks are low, allowing firms to expand their networks. Furthermore, reputational capital may act as a partial substitute for relational embeddedness, again permitting firms to expand their networks. Our findings enhance understanding of the boundary conditions associated with the relational network approach to partner selections and network behaviour. Copyright (c) 2010 The Authors. Journal compilation (c) 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Meuleman, Miguel ; Lockett, Andy ; Manigart, Sophie ; Wright, Mike |
Published in: |
Journal of Management Studies. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0022-2380. - Vol. 47.2010, 6, p. 995-1019
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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