Patent Licensing and Price Discrimination

We extend the Kamien and Tauman model of patent licensing by introducing heterogeneous licensees that differ in their marginal costs using the licensed technology. We show that price discrimination does not necessarily ensure an efficient allocation of licenses. Moreover, it is possible that more licenses are sold without rather than with price discrimination.

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Year of publication:	2006-02-27
Authors:	Gleave, Sandro ; Feess, Eberhard
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 4.2006, 10, p. 1-10
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Endogenous valuation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D4 - Market Structure and Pricing ; L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629869