Patent licensing with Bertrand competitors

We study optimal licensing contracts in a differentiated Bertrand duopoly, and show that per-unit contracts are preferred to ad valorem contracts by the patentee, while welfare is higher under the ad valorem contract. The difference between Cournot and Bertrand case is explained in terms of quantity effect and profits effect.

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Year of publication:	2012-04
Authors:	Colombo, Stefano ; Filippini, Luigi
Institutions:	Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Subject:	Two-part contracts \| patent licensing \| ad valorem royalties \| Bertrand

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number itemq1262 53 pages
Classification:	D45 - Rationing; Licensing
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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