Pay-for-Performance, Reputation, and the Reduction of Costly Overprovision

We investigate the effect of reputational motivation on output in a scenario of overprovision of medical treatment. We assume that physicians differ in their degree of altruism, enjoy being perceived as good but, dislike being perceived as greedy. We show that better reputational motivation unambiguously reduces the costs of healthcare provision and the magnitude of overprovision which in turn raises patient benefits.

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Year of publication:	2015-03-22
Authors:	Kairies, Nadja
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 35.2015, 1, p. 702-715
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	altruism \| performance \| motivation \| reputation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	I1 - Health ; I0 - Health, Education, and Welfare. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011208201