Paying for Staying : Managerial Contracts and the Retention Motive

Talented managers may leave the firm in order to work elsewhere. Focusing on the portability of managers-resources, we develop a model in which managerial compensation is designed to prevent inefficient departure. The model rationalizes the widespread use of flat salaries in combination with performance-vesting stock options and is consistent with observed differences in compensation contracts across individuals, firms, industries, and countries

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Ellingsen, Tore ; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Mitarbeiterbindung \| Employee retention \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Motivation \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (36 p)
Series:	NHH Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper ; No. 8/2012
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 20, 2012 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2033122 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014171075