Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game

In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Tan, Fangfang ; Xiao, Erte
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 117.2012, 3, p. 589-591
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Social dilemmas \| Third party punishment \| Cooperation \| Experiment

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594214