Penalties and the deterrence of unlawful collusion

This paper investigates the size of penalties required to deter cartel formation. Allowing the penalty to be increasing in duration within the infinitely repeated game framework, penalties do not need to be as severe as previous research would suggest.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Harrington, Joseph E.
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 124.2014, 1, p. 33-36
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Collusion \| Antitrust \| Crime

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance ; L4 - Antitrust Policy
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010784968