Penalties as incentives for punctuality and regularity in tendered Swedish public transport
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Pyddoke, Roger |
Published in: |
Research in transportation economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0739-8859, ZDB-ID 86498-5. - Vol. 83.2020, p. 1-9
|
Subject: | Cancelled departures | Customer satisfaction | Delay | Design | Incentive | Monitoring | Outcomes | Penalty | Kundenzufriedenheit | Schweden | Sweden | Anreiz | Incentives | Strafe | Punishment | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Dienstleistungsqualität | Service quality | Öffentlicher Nahverkehr | Local public transport |
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