Pensions in Labor Contracts.
This paper con siders the optimality of a two-period employment contract between a firm and a worker, in which the firm provides the employee with insurance against states of low consumption with a wage/pension payment schedule contingent upon the worker's productivity and state of employment. The paper shows that with endogenous quits and dismissals, the equilibrium pension plan could either impose vesting requirements or provide for severance pay depending on the relative perceptions of the probability of separation by the two parties, the worker's productivi ty in each state of employment, and the firm's policy regarding emplo yee retention. Copyright 1988 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Year of publication: |
1988
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Authors: | Hu, Sheng Cheng |
Published in: |
International Economic Review. - Department of Economics. - Vol. 29.1988, 3, p. 477-92
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Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Saved in:
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