Perfect Equilibria in Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study

This article presents an experimental study of bidding behavior in sequential auctions in which there are budget constraints and perfect information. Our experiments test both the properties of such auctions and the predictive power of a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. We find that budget constraints affect the behavior of bidders and that the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is generally a good predictor of prices.

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Year of publication:	1988
Authors:	Pitchik, Carolyn ; Schotter, Andrew
Published in:	RAND Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0741-6261. - Vol. 19.1988, 3, p. 363-388
Publisher:	The RAND Corporation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353995