Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information

We obtain conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game with infinitely many types and/or strategies that ensure the existence of a perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The main existence results are illustrated in the context of all-pay auctions.

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
Publisher:	New Brunswick, NJ : Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Subject:	infinite game of incomplete information \| perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium \| payoff security

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2017-03
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	881466794 [GVK] hdl:10419/162936 [Handle] RePEc:rut:rutres:201703 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011687930