Performance-based compensation and firm value : experimental evidence
Year of publication: |
December 2015
|
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Authors: | Pfeiffer, Glenn M. ; Shields, Timothy W. |
Published in: |
Accounting horizons : a quarterly publication of the American Accounting Association. - Sarasota, Fla. : American Accounting Association, ISSN 0888-7993, ZDB-ID 638756-1. - Vol. 29.2015, 4, p. 777-798
|
Subject: | executive compensation | experimental markets | sorting | incentives | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Experiment | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unternehmenswert | Firm value | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Theorie | Theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Aktienoption | Stock option |
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