Performance evaluation, managerial hedging, and contract termination
Yu Huang, Nengjiu Ju, Hao Xing
| Year of publication: |
2023
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Huang, Yu ; Ju, Nengjiu ; Xing, Hao |
| Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5501, ZDB-ID 2023019-9. - Vol. 69.2023, 8, p. 4953-4971
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| Subject: | managerial hedging | moral hazard | optimal contracting | performance evaluation | Hedging | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertrag | Contract | Führungskräfte | Managers | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Performance-Messung | Performance measurement | Portfolio-Management | Portfolio selection | Personalbeurteilung | Employee appraisal |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4533 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014339485