Performance‐maximizing large contests
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Olszewski, Wojciech ; Siegel, Ron |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 15.2020, 1, p. 57-88
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Subject: | Large contests | contest design | optimal contests | mechanism design | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Rent-Seeking | Rent seeking | Wettbewerb | Competition | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE3588 [DOI] hdl:10419/217106 [Handle] |
Classification: | D44 - Auctions ; d47 ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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