Performance myopia : the effect of pay-for-performance incentives on exploration and coordination
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Králová, Věra ; Král, Pavel |
Published in: |
Acta oeconomica Pragensia : vědecký časopis Vysoke Školy Ekonomické v Praze. - Praha : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 0572-3043, ZDB-ID 959721-9. - Vol. 27.2019, 1, p. 50-69
|
Subject: | pay-for-performance | incentives | exploration | coordination | organisational design | cooperation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Anreiz | Incentives | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Koordination | Coordination |
-
Inequality aversion and the distribution of rewards in organizations
Gueye, Mamadou, (2021)
-
Social preferences and the distribution of rewards
Soubeyran, Raphaël, (2022)
-
Group incentives or individual incentives? : a real-effort weak-link experiment
Bortolotti, Stefania, (2016)
- More ...
-
Král, Pavel, (2023)
-
Approaches to changing organizational structure : the effect of drivers and communication
Král, Pavel, (2016)
-
Rites de passage et cycles de vie de la famille noble
KRÁL, Pavel, (2007)
- More ...