Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hodler, Roland ; Loertscher, Simon ; Rohner, Dominic |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 124.2014, 2, p. 195-198
|
Subject: | Persuasion | Costly signaling | Expert advice | Information distortion | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Signalling | Theorie | Theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Konsumentenverhalten | Consumer behaviour |
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