Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty

We study the strategic interaction between a decision maker who needs to take a binary decision but is uncertain about relevant facts and an informed expert who can send a message to the decision maker but has a preference over the decision. We show that the probability that the expert can persuade the decision maker to take the expert’s preferred decision is a hump-shaped function of his costs of sending dishonest messages.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Hodler, Roland ; Loertscher, Simon ; Rohner, Dominic
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 124.2014, 2, p. 195-198
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Persuasion \| Costly signaling \| Expert advice \| Information distortion

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933302