Platform design when sellers use pricing algorithms
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Johnson, Justin P. ; Rhodes, Andrew ; Wildenbeest, Matthijs R. |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1468-0262, ZDB-ID 1477253-X. - Vol. 91.2023, 5, p. 1841-1879
|
Subject: | Algorithms | collusion | platform design | prominence | Q-learning | Theorie | Theory | Algorithmus | Algorithm | Digitale Plattform | Digital platform | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Preismanagement | Pricing strategy | Netzwerkökonomik | Network economics | Fertigungsprogramm | Master production schedule | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Preiswettbewerb | Price competition |
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