Playing a Better Global Warming Game: Does it Help to be Green?
It is commonly believed that an increase in environmental awareness is conducive to the protection of the global commons. Moreover, it has been proposed that governments should "give a good example" by unilaterally reducing emissions. In a simple analytical framework it is shown that these relations are less straightforward than intuitively expected. On the contrary: "Good intentions" might lead to lower abatement targets within an international environmental agreement and to lower stability due to strategic behavior of governments.
Year of publication: |
1998
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Authors: | Endres, Alfred ; Finus, Michael |
Published in: |
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES). - Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik / Société Suisse d"Économie et de Statistique - SGVS/SSES, ISSN 0303-9692. - Vol. 134.1998, I, p. 21-40
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Publisher: |
Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik / Société Suisse d"Économie et de Statistique - SGVS/SSES |
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