Playing Strategically against Nature? Decisions Viewed from a Game-Theoretic Frame

Common research on decision-making investigates non-interdependent situations, i.e., quot;games against naturequot;. However, humans are social beings and many decisions are made in social settings, where they mutually influence each other, i.e., quot;strategic gamesquot;. Mathematical game theory gives a benchmark for rational decisions in such situations. The strategic character makes psychological decision-making more complex by introducing the outcomes for others as an additional attribute of that situation; it also broadens the field for potential coordination and cooperation problems. From an evolutionary point of view, behavior in strategic situations was at a competitive edge. This paper demonstrates that even in games against nature, people sometimes decide as if they were in a strategic game; it outlines theoretical and empirical consequences of such a shift of the frame. It examines whether some irrationalities of human decision-making might be explained by such a shift in grasping the situation. It concludes that the mixed strategies in games against nature demand a high expertise and can only be found in situations where these strategies improve the effects of minimax-strategies that are used in cases of risk-aversion