Plea Bargaining as a Mean to Maximum Sentence

This paper outlines the findings of a model of plea bargaining with multiple defendants, in which a prosecutor makes plea offer sequentially. It is shown that plea discount can be minimized with sequential offers and that not all of defendants shall be induced to plead guilty. By allowing sequential offer, a prosecutor has more power in the plea bargaining, which may increase social welfare by giving appropriate level of punishment to the guilty

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Kim, Jung-Wook
Publisher:	[2016]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Rechtsökonomik \| Economic analysis of law \| Rechtsprechung \| Court decisions \| Strafverfahren \| Criminal procedure \| Verhandlungen \| Negotiations \| Strafe \| Punishment \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (11 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: KDI Journal of Economic Policy 2013, 35(1) 139-146 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 12, 2013 erstellt
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; K14 - Criminal Law ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994223