Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | McMurray, Joseph |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 133.2022, p. 150-161
|
Subject: | Common interest | Competition | Elections | Epistemic democracy | Ideology | Information aggregation | Jury theorem | Median voter | Pandering | Polarization | Public opinion | Voting | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Wahl | Election | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy | Öffentliche Meinung | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Medianwähler-Modell | Ideologie | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Demokratie | Democracy |
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