Political Accountability, Electoral Control and Media Bias
type="main"> <p>Are anti-establishment mass media really useful in preventing politicians from behaving dishonestly? This paper models the direction of media bias, and shows that the probability of a dishonest action by an incumbent is higher (than that in the case of no media bias) if and only if the mass media have some degree of “anti-incumbent” bias (i.e. information favourable to the incumbent is converted into unfavourable news about the incumbent with a positive probability), provided that the incumbent is less likely to be opportunistic than a challenger in the upcoming election. This result holds irrespective of the degree of “pro-incumbent” bias.
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Adachi, Takanori ; Hizen, Yoichi |
Published in: |
The Japanese Economic Review. - Japanese Economic Association - JEA, ISSN 1352-4739. - Vol. 65.2014, 3, p. 316-343
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Publisher: |
Japanese Economic Association - JEA |
Saved in:
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