Political conflict and bargaining in a New Keynesian model of fiscal stabilization
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Flamini, Francesca ; Leith, Campbell B. |
Published in: |
Macroeconomic dynamics. - Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press, ISSN 1469-8056, ZDB-ID 1501533-6. - Vol. 25.2021, 8, p. 2128-2179
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Subject: | Bargaining | Fiscal Policy | Government Debt | Investment | Markov Perfect Equilibrium | Monetary Policy | New Keynesian Model | Recursive Optimization | Finanzpolitik | Fiscal policy | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Neoklassische Synthese | Neoclassical synthesis | Öffentliche Schulden | Public debt | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Markov-Kette | Markov chain | Stabilisierungspolitik | Stabilization policy | Regelbindung versus Diskretion | Rules versus discretion |
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