Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Application to the United States, 1973 and 1983

We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive polical economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influcence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitely distinguished and computed.

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Year of publication:	2000-03
Authors:	Hotte, Louis ; Winer, Stanley L.
Institutions:	Carleton University, Department of Economics
Subject:	political competition \| probabilistic voting \| political influence \| tax policy \| public goods \| GEMTAP \| computable equilibrium

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Series:	Carleton Economic Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published: Revised version in Public Choice, Vol. 109, No. 1-2 (October 2001), pp. 69–99 Number 00-11 41 pages
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; H20 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue. General ; H41 - Public Goods ; C68 - Computable General Equilibrium Models
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627013