Political Organizations, Interest Groups and Citizens Engagement: An Integrated Model of Democracy

The paper starts with a theoretical reinterpretation of some classical topics in the public choice literature, where specific elements of contract theory and the theory of the firm are introduced. By putting into contact these completely different fields of economics, it defines a general theoretical framework for political behaviors whose implications go beyond those determined by the standard self-interest assumption. Political organizations, as suppliers of public policies, are supposed to maximize a residual quantum consisting in the public authority that can actually be exercised after all the electoral commitments, with voters and interests groups, have been fulfilled. This residual right—which can be seen also as a degree of discretion necessary for ruling parties to deal with unforeseen contingencies—is based on the reputational capital (goodwill) accumulated over time by political organizations and represents the intangible asset that secures voters’ loyalty and, consequently, the legitimacy to exercise public authority in the long run. When a deficit of goodwill occurs, a chain of “exit” strategies by voters can lead to undesirable results unless an effective “voice” option for citizens exists. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014