Political promotion, CEO incentives, and the relationship between pay and performance
| Year of publication: |
2019
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Cao, Xiaping (Jerry) ; Lemmon, Michael L. ; Pan, Xiaofei ; Qian, Meijun ; Tian, Gary Gang |
| Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 65.2019, 7, p. 2947-2965
|
| Subject: | managerial incentives | political promotion | performance | CEO compensation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Lohn | Wages | Anreiz | Incentives | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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