Political Support for Targeted versus Universalistic Welfare Policies

This paper compares the political support for a targeted and a universalistic welfare policy in a model in which incomes are stochastic (so that welfare policies have an insurance benefit) and unequal ex ante (so that welfare policies have a redistributive effect). With self-interested voting, low benefits may so reduce the probability of receiving benefits for the majority that the majority prefers to reduce benefits even further than zero.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Moene, K.O. ; Wallerstein, M.
Institutions:	Økonomisk institutt, Universitetet i Oslo
Subject:	SOCIAL WELFARE \| VOTING \| SOCIAL POLICY

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Series:	Memorandum.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Memorandum Number 17/1997 30 pages
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation ; H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005424059