POLITICIANS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND REGULATORS: A MULTIPLE- PRINCIPALS AGENCY THEORY OF REGULATION (OR: LET THEM BE BRIBED)
Year of publication: |
1988
|
---|---|
Authors: | SPILLER, P.T. |
Institutions: | Hoover Institution on War Revolution & Peace, Stanford University |
Subject: | regulations | politicians | interest groups |
-
Equilibrium reforms and endogenous complexity
Morelli, Massimo, (2020)
-
Câmara, Odilon, (2015)
-
Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
Prat, Andrea, (1998)
- More ...
-
Strategy, Structure, and Antitrust in the Carbonated Soft-Drink Industry
Muris, T.J., (1994)
-
Econometric Market Delineation
Scheffman, D.T., (1996)
-
Spiller, P.T., (1990)
- More ...