Pollution control with imperfectly observable emissions

In this paper, a model of environmental regulation with imperfect monitoring of emissions is presented. The regulator can use linear output taxes and emission taxes to influence the pollution level of a risk-averse firm. In contrast to the perfect monitoring case, a tax mix will usually be optimal. The relative weight depends on the degree of risk aversion and monitoring imperfection, and on technological factors. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Schmutzler, Armin
Published in:	Environmental & Resource Economics. - European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, ISSN 0924-6460. - Vol. 7.1996, 3, p. 251-262
Publisher:	European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
Subject:	Asymmetric information \| pollution control \| emission taxes \| output taxes \| monitoring problems

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005722158