Pre-commitment and personality: Behavioral explanations in ultimatum games
In a laboratory ultimatum bargaining experiment, responder behavior is more consistent with game-theoretic predictions when responders indicate a binding minimum acceptable offer (MAO) or when rejection penalizes a "hostage" third player. In general, female subjects indicated higher MAOs but had a much greater reaction than males to the presence of a third player. Offers increase in the presence of a binding MAO but are not affected by a third player. Behavior in our experiment is also generally consistent with hypotheses based on a popular personality test instrument.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Schmitt, Pamela ; Shupp, Robert ; Swope, Kurtis ; Mayer, Justin |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681. - Vol. 66.2008, 3-4, p. 597-605
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
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