Precarious Democracies, Political Negotiation and Selective Predation

This article analyzes, at the subnational level, a political system in which there is a precarious democracy given that the mayor, as a member of a political organization constituting a political patron- age machine, not only co-opts civil society but also seeks to plunder municipal funds to reinforce his political hegemony, weakening and even destroying the existing institutional framework. In direct contradiction to the central theses of economic voting and orthodox political economy, the main ?nding of this article demonstrates that the executive, through his local power networks operating in the context of a deteriorated social structure, does not foster equitable wealth redistribution but instead promotes local empowerment processes through clientelist practices, creating a cartel government made up of the parties represented on the municipal council. The council, as a veto player, will strengthen and support the establishment of a predator state led by the executive.