Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game

We present an endogenous timing game of action commitment in which players can steal from each other parts of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible pie (market). We show how the incentives to preempt or to follow the rivals radically change with the number of players involved in the game. In the course of the analysis we also introduce, discuss and apply the concept of pu-dominance, a generalization of the risk-dominance criterion to games with more than two players.

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Year of publication:	2008-09
Authors:	Gallice, Andrea

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Gallice, Andrea (2008): Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game.
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015217234