Preference-directed regulation when ethical environmental policy choices are formed with limited information

Preference-directed regulation (PDR) can supplement traditional environmental policies through frequent regulatory revision (Livermore, Va Environ Law J 25:311–386, <CitationRef CitationID="CR20">2007</CitationRef>). Using original survey data, PDR is operationalized via counterfactual simulations within a limited information discrete choice model. Augmenting individual opinions about one of the three policies at driving environmental outcomes, stakeholders can induce preference switching in favor of or in detriment to a specific policy. The three policies are summarized as: (1) ban; (2) tax; and (3) label. The resulting substitution patterns demonstrate that the extent of preference switching between policies depends on the relative change in individual opinions about a policy. Furthermore, different forms of PDR may be more effective at inducing preference switching in favor of or in detriment to a specific policy. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014