Preference for Information and Dynamic Consistency

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we discuss whether an intrinsic information lover (say, an anxious person) is likely to be dynamically consistent.

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Year of publication:	1999-01
Authors:	Grant, Simon ; Kajii, Atsushi ; Polak, Ben
Institutions:	Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Subject:	Information \| non-expected utility \| dynamic consistency \| randomization \| anxiety

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Theory and Decision (2000), 48: 263-286 The price is None Number 1208 18 pages
Classification:	D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762811