Preselection and expert advice

Elisabeth Schulte and Mike Felgenhauer

We study the effects of preselection on an expert's incentive to give truthful advice in a decision environment in which certain decisions yield more precise estimates about the expert's expertise. The introduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker can study the case before asking for advice, alters the expert's perception of the problem. We identify conditions under which preselection occurs in equilibrium. We show that if the expert adjusts his behavior, the option to preselect may reduce the expected utility of the decision maker.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Schulte, Elisabeth ; Felgenhauer, Mike
Publisher:	Marburg : Univ., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics
Subject:	Reputation \| cheap talk \| safe haven \| Experten \| Experts \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Unternehmensberatung \| Consultancy services \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Kommunikation \| Communication

Extent:	Online-Ressource (31 S.)
Series:	Joint discussion paper series in economics : publ. by the Universities of Aachen, Gießen, Göttingen, Kassel, Marburg, Siegen. - Marburg : Philipps University Marburg, Department of Business Administration & Economics, ISSN 1867-3678, ZDB-ID 2499212-4. - Vol. 24-2015 MACIE paper series. - Marburg : MACIE, ZDB-ID 2830550-4. - Vol. 2015/1
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen : PDF-Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/121317 [Handle]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302441