Price delegation and salesforce contract design with asymmetric risk aversion coefficient of sales agents
Yue Dai, Xiuli Chao
| Year of publication: |
2016
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Dai, Yue ; Chao, Xiuli |
| Published in: |
International journal of production economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0925-5273, ZDB-ID 1092526-0. - Vol. 172.2016, p. 31-42
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| Subject: | Delegation | Salesforce incentive | Asymmetric information | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Verkaufspersonal | Salespeople | Kooperative Führung | Participative leadership | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.11.006 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011442304